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Letters to the Editor. . . 
(Note: The lournal of the American Medical 
Association (lAMA) refused to print the 
following letter. 
To the Editor: 
In her recent article (lAMA, Oct. 21, 
1992) Dr. Stotland attempts to argue that 
post-abortion trauma is a "myth" and 
factually "non-existent". Clearly, more un-
biased and expanded empirical studies need 
to be conducted in this area before the issue 
can be satisfactorily resolved. I am not a 
trained psychiatrist. However, as a former 
biomedical researcher and present philo-
sopher and bioethicist, I would like to suggest 
one possible source of Dr. Stotland's denial of 
such a trauma - i.e., the denial (by many of us) 
of the actual status of what it is that is aborted. 
It would seem that this is critical to any factual 
understanding of adverse reactions (however 
psychiatry would categorize them) several 
years after the abortion event. I applaud Dr. 
Stotland's desire to "bring the discussion into 
the scientific medical literature", yet there 
must be an unbiased effort to be truthful and 
consistent in acknowledging in that literature 
what are "facts" and what are "myths". 
Many of us have been thoroughly con-
vinced by the scientific (and the bioethics) 
literature itself (before the fact of abortion) 
that the human embryo or human fetus is 
either not a human being, or if it is, that it is 
not a human person.' If either is factually the 
case, the decision of a woman to abort or not 
to abort her unborn child is a priori made 
considerably more justifiable and "rational". 
Elaborate scientific arguments have been 
flooding the biomedical literature for some 
years now, positing such scientific claims as: 
the human embryo or human fetus is just a 
"blob" or piece ofthe mother's tissues; that all 
of the genetic information specific for a 
human being is not present at fertilization; 
that human embryos can give rise to 
teratomas or hydatidform moles and there-
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fore are not "human";2 that all of the cells 
from the 5-6 day embryo trophoblast layer 
are discarded after birth and therefore it is 
really a "pre-embryo", that totipotent cells 
can each develop into later individual human 
beings, and that twinning can not take place 
after 14 days - and therefore the early 
human embryo is not a true "individual", and 
therefore not a true human being yet;3 that full 
differentiation is completed by 14 days;· and 
that true "personhood" is not present until 
"brain-birth", i.e., the formation of the nerve-
net, neocortex or whole brain integrating 
system.s 
If such "medical facts" (and others like 
them) were actually true, it is small wonder 
that not only young teen-age girls and 
younger women, but also boy friends, 
husbands, parents, grandparents, priests, minis-
ters and counselors, physicians, nurses, 
researchers, public policy makers, Supreme 
Court Justices - and yes, even psychiatrists 
- have bought into such "scientific" claims 
which are really, themselves, in fact "myths" 
and "non-existent." Surely such scientific 
misinformation has bolstered at least tem-
porarily their firm convictions that the early 
human embryo or human fetus is not really a 
human being or a human person, and 
therefore disposable or insignificant in con-
trast to the autonomous rights of "women 
who become pregnant under problematic 
circumstances." Unfortunately, these "scien-
tific facts" in the biomedical literature are all 
incorrect; yet I do not hear Dr. Stotland 
calling for an objective purging of these 
"myths" from the biomedical literature in the 
name of scientific accuracy and the physician-
patient relationship. 
To determine if the human embryo is a 
human being, all one has to do is count the 
number of chromosomes under a microscope, 
and observe the functions and activities which 
are present immediately after fertilization. 
The real scientific facts are the following. 
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The early human embryo and human fetus is 
not a "blob" or piece of tissue of the mother. 
When the 23 chromosomes of the sperm and 
the 23 chromosomes of the ovum are 
combined (by the end of fertilization), a new, 
unique living individual with 46 chromo-
somes (the number and quality specific for the 
human species)6 is formed. Although this 
means that the human embryo is a human 
being, the chromosomal make-up of the 
human embryo and fetus is qualitatively 
different from that of either the mother or the 
father. That is, the genetic identity of the 
human embryo is different from the genetic 
identity of the tissues of the mother. The 
embryo is already a male or a female; 
immediately specifically human enzymes and 
proteins are formed; specifically human 
tissues and organs will be formed.? Virtually 
all of the genetic information the human being 
will ever have or need is present immediately 
at fertilization. No genetic information is 
gained or lost throughout development -
only the use of some information is lost 
through mechanisms such as methylation.8 
This original genetic information "cascades" 
throughout the course of human develop-
ment, determining later molecular informa-
tion, tissue and organ formation;9 and it 
includes the genetic information needed for 
differentiation,1O totipotency (which is quite 
normal) and all of the processes of embryo-
genesis - sometimes even twinning. Entities 
such as teratomas and hydatidiform moles do 
not arise from genetically normal human 
embryos, but from abnormal embryos to 
begin with (e.g., dispermy)." All of the cells 
from the trophoblast layer are not all 
discarded after birth, but many from the yolk 
sac and allantois are incorporated into the 
embryo-proper as the early blood cells and 
the primordium of the primitive gut, and in 
the human adult as the median umbilical 
ligament and blood cells. 12 Twinning is 
possible after 14 days, e.g., with fetus-in-fetu 
and Siamese twins.13 And there is no scientific 
physiological basis for a valid parallel 
between "brain death" and "brain birth", 
sentience or self-consciousness. 14 Full human 
development is not complete until after 20 
years of age,15 and full brain integration and 
the actual exercising of "rational attributes" 
are not present until several years after birth.16 
Thus any arguments about physiological 
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"preconditions" for either sentience or rational 
attributes are themselves arguments from 
potentiality, and actually depend physio-
logically on the precondition of the single-cell 
human zygote itself. If either actual sentience 
or rational attributes are the rationale for 
human "personhood", then newborns, young 
children, Alzheimer's and Parkinson's patients, 
alcoholics, drug addicts, the mentally ill and 
depressed (to name but a few) are not 
"persons" either, and thus, by the same logic, 
could be "disposed of'. 
The position that the early human embryo 
and human fetus is not a human being or a 
human person, then, is itself scientifically and 
medically a "myth". Such incorrect medical 
information should be brought out into the 
"light" of professional scientific scrutiny as 
well as any information concerning the 
"myth" of post-abortion trauma. Yet how 
many physicians, or psychiatrists, are willing 
to "provide [this] sound scientific information 
[to their patients] to help them make informed 
decisions about health issues"? Not many. 
Yes, Dr. Stotland is correct to note the 
increase in the conflict concerning abortion, 
especially since the Roe v Wade decision. But 
she implies that religious and personal 
opinions which reject abortion are factually 
misplaced and are being imposed on women 
who have the absolute autonomous right to 
choose whatever they want in regard to their 
unborn child. She also implies that these 
irrational (because personal and/ or religious) 
claims about post-abortion trauma are ham-
pering the physician's and the psychiatrist's 
role to "counsel, advocate for, and treat 
individual patients on the basis of medical 
knowledge and in the patient's best interest". 
Yet Dr. Stotland refuses to consider that 
perhaps some personal opinions and some 
religious convictions are rooted in non-
relative, objective facts. For example, the 
human embryo and the human fetus are 
human beings. Perhaps the correct embryo-
logical facts are obtained years after the 
abortion. Or perhaps the woman eventually 
puts two + two together in some other way. 
That correct information, coupled with a 
religious commitment to respect all innocent 
human beings (regardless of their race, sex, 
nationality - or size) could conceivably 
trigger such a "traumatic" event in the mother 
who has previously naively aborted what she 
thought at the time was just a "blob" of her 
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own tissue. If she has also donated her aborted 
unborn child for fetal tissue transplant 
research, perhaps she could also come to the 
realization of another medical "fact" - that 
her fetus was not dead or anesthesized when 
his or her brain cells were removed for such 
"therapy". These medical "facts" should also 
be constitutive of any realistic physician-
patient counseling - and yet they are not. 
A woman could also come to the gradual 
realization that a woman's - or any other 
human being's - "pure autonomy" is also a 
"myth". Certainly the field of bioethics is 
beginning to come to grips with that dialogue. 
No one - male or female - has an absolute 
right to choose anything, just because 
conditions are difficult or a mistake was 
made. Our choices are always qualified; and 
we must all live with the consequences of our 
"choices". Again, Dr. Stotland refuses to 
consider that she is - in fact - medically 
treating two patients when she is counseling 
about abortion - the mother and her unborn 
child. If there is such a thing as post-abortion 
trauma, to counsel for abortion could in the 
long run be counter-productive to the "best 
interests of the mother" - not to mention the 
best interests of her unborn child - who is a 
human being right from the start. 
Finally, I respect Dr. Stotland's concern 
about what has come to be identified as a 
"woman's issue". I myself am a professional 
woman, and I know perfectly well that 
women have been the subject of serious and 
unjustified abuse and discrimination. How-
ever, this does not condone the current 
"rationalization" and legalization of every-
thing and anything, simply because many 
women "want" it. Abortion is, in fact, 
ultimately an aggression against women. The 
sooner women acknowledge that fact the 
sooner more realistic counseling of women in 
"problematic" situations can be provided by 
physicians and psychiatrists alike. Dr. Stotland 
should not be so selective about which "facts" 
to explore in the biomedical literature. Nor 
should she be so quick to selectively accept as 
"facts" things which are in fact "myths". 
-Dianne N. Irving, M.A., Ph.D. 
Assistant Prof. Philosophy/Bioethics 
Department of Philosophy 
DeSales School of Theology 
Washington, D.C. 20017 
February 1994 
References 
I. But see Irving DN. Philosophical and 
Scientific A nalysis of the Nature of the Early 
Human Embryo. Doctoral dissertation, Depart-
ment of Philosophy, Georgetown University, 
Washington, D.C.: 1991; Irving DN. Scientific and 
philosophical expertise: an evaluation of the 
arguments on fetal personhood. Linacre Quarterly, 
Feb. 1993; Irving DN. The impact of scientific 
misinformation: philosophy, theology, biomedical 
ethics, public policy. A ccountability in Research. 
Feb. 1993 (forthcoming); Carberry J, Kmiec DW. 
Abortion: how law denies science. Chicago 
Tribune. July 14; Fisher A. Individuogenesis and a 
recent book by Fr. Norman Ford. Anthropotes. 
1991:2:199; McCullagh P. The Foetus as Trans-
plant Donor: Scientific. Social and Ethical Perspec-
tives. New York, John Wiley and Sons: 1987. 
2. Bedate C, Cefalo R. The zygote: to be or not 
to be a person. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy. 
1989:14:6:641. Also Bole J.T. Metaphysical 
accounts of the zygote as a person and the veto 
power of facts. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy. 
1989:14:647-653, and Zygotes, souls, substances 
and persons. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy. 
1990:15:637-652. 
3. Grobstein C. The early development of human 
embryos. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 
1985:10:213-236. Also McCormick R. Who or 
what is the preembryo? Kennedy 1nstitute of Ethics 
JournaL 1991 :1:1-15. 
4. Ford N. When Did 1 Begin? New York: 
Cambridge University Press: 1988:137, 156. 
5. Jones DG. Brain birth and personal identity. 
Journal of Medical Ethics 1989: 15:4: 173-178; 
MacKay D. in Jones 1989; Rahner, Ruff and 
Haring, in Jones 1989; Sass H. Brain death and 
brain life: a proposal for normative agreement. 
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 1989: 14:45-
59; Singer and Wells, in Jones 1989; Tauer C. 
Personhood and human embryos and fetuses. 
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy. 1985: I 0:253-
266; Lockwood M. Warnock versus Powel (and 
Harradine): when does potentiality count? Bioethics 
1988:3:3:187-213; Goldenring J. Development of 
the fetal brain. New England Journal of Medicine. 
1982:307:564, and The brain-life theory: towards a 
consistent biological definition of humanness. 
Journal of Medical Ethics 1985: II : 198-120; 
Kushner T. Having a life versus being alive. Journal 
of Medical Ethics. 1984: I 0:5-8; Gertler, in Singer P. 
Practical Ethics. London, Cambridge University 
Press: 1981 ; Bennett MV. Personhood from a 
neuroscientific perspective in Doerr et al. Abonion 
Rights and Fetal "Personhood". Long Beach, 
Cresline Press: 1989. 
6. Moore KL, The Developing Human. Phila-
delphia: W.B. Saunders Co.: 1982: 14; Lewin Bed. 
Genes JIL New York: John Wiley and Sons: 
5 
1983:9-13,386-394, 401 ; Emery AEH. Elements 
of Medical Genetics. New York: Churchill 
Livingstone: 1983:19, 93; also obvious from the 
following reserach: Gordon K et al. Production of 
human tissue plasminogen activator in transgenic 
mouse milk. Bio Technology. 1987:5:1l83: Weis-
hous T et al. Secretion of emzymatically active 
human renin from mammalian cells using an avian 
retroviral vector. Genes. 1986:45:2: 121-129; 
Tanaka A; Fujita D. Expression of a molecularly 
cloned human C-SRC oncogene by using a 
replication-competent retroviral vector. Molecular 
and Cellular Biology. 1986:6: II :3900-3909; 
Schnieke et al. Introduction of the human pro alpha 
I (I) collagen gene into pro alpha I (I) - deficient 
Mov-13 mouse cells leads to formation of 
functional mouse-human hybrid type I collagen. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Science 
-USA. Feb. 1987:84:3:764-768;HArt C, Awgul-
witch A et al. Homeobox gene complex on a mouse 
chromosome II:molecular cloning, expression in 
embryogenesis, and homology to a human 
homeobox locus. Cell 1985:43: I :9-18; Kollias G et 
al. The human beta-globulin gene contains a 
downstream developmental specific enhancer. 
Nucleic A cids Research. July 1987:15:14:5739-47; 
Olofsson, B, Pizon Vet. al. Structure and expression 
of the chicken epidermal growth factor receptor 
gene locus. European Journal of Biochemistry. 
1986:160:2:261-266; Saez L, Leinwand S. Char-
acterization of diverse forms of myosin light chain 
gene; unexpected interspecies homology with 
repetitive DNA. Archives of Biochemistry and 
Biophysics. 1984:233:2:565-572; Olle R et al. 
Structural relation among mouse and human 
immunoglobulin VH genes in the subgroup III. 
Nucleic Acids Research. 1983:1l:22:7887-97; 
Proudfoot N et al. The structure of the human 
zeta-globin gene and a closely linked, nearly 
identical pseudogene. Cell 1982:31 :32:553-563. 
7. Kollias 1987; Covarrubias L et al. Cellular 
DNA rearrangements and early developmental 
arrest caused by DNA insertion in transgenic 
mouse embryos. Molecular and Cellular Biology. 
1987:7:6:2243-2247; Humphries RK et al. Transfer 
of human and murine globin-gene sequences into 
transgenic mice. American Journal of Human 
Genetics 1985:37:2:295-310; Khillan J et al. 
Tissue-specific, inducible and functional expression 
of the Ead MHC class II gene in transgenic mice. 
£MBO Journal 1985;4:9:2225-30; Palmiter R et 
al. Cell lineage ablation in transgenic mice by cell-
specific expression of a toxin gene. Cell. 
1985:43:1:9-18. 
8. Moore 1982:14; Lewin 1983:9-13, 202-203, 
681 ; Emery 1983:93; Lejeune J in Martin Palmer 
ed. A Symphony of the Prebom Child: Part Two. 
Hagerstown, MD; NAAPC: 1989:9-10, 16-19,30. 
9. Lewin 1983:11-13, 202-203, 681 ; Emery 
1983:93. 
6 
10. That differentiation is not caused by the 
mother and is determined by the embryo: Holtzer H 
et al. Induction-<iependent and Iineage-ilependent 
models for cell-diversification are mutually ex-
clusive. Progress in Clinical Biological Research. 
1985:175:3-1l; Mavilio F, Sineone A et al. 
Differential and stage-related expression in 
embryonic tissues of a new human homeobox gene. 
Nature 1986:324:6098:664-668; Hart C et al1985. 
II. Szulmann AE, Surti U. The syndromes of 
hydatidiform mole. I. Cytogenic and morphologic 
correlations. American Journal of Obstetrics and 
Gynecology. 1978:131 :665-671 ; Moore 1982:30; 
Lejeune 1989:19-19; Wimmers MSE et al. 
Chromosome studies on early human embryos 
fertilized in vitro. Human Reproduction. 
1988:7:894-900; Lawler SD, Fisher RA. Genetic 
studies in hydatidiform mole with clinical correla-
tions. Placenta. 1987:8:77-88; Martin GR. Terato-
carcinomas and mammalian embryogenesis. Science 
1980:209:768-76; Alberts et al. Molecular Biology 
of the Cell New York:Garland Publishing: 1983. 
12. Moore I 982:33,62-63,1l 1,127; Chauda K 
et al. An embryonic pattern of expression of a 
human fetal globin gene in transgenic mice. Nature. 
1986:319:6055:685-689; Migliaccio G et al. 
Human embryonic hemopoiesis. Kinetics of 
progenitors and precursor underlying the yolk sac-
liver transition. Journal of Clinical Investigation. 
1986:78:1:51-60. 
13. Moore 1982:133; Dawson K, in Peter 
Singer et al. Embryo ExperimentaJion. New York: 
Cambridge University Press; 1990:43-52. 
14. Jones 1989: 15;4; 173-178. 
15. Moore 1982:1. 
16. Jones 1989:173-178; Engelhardt T. The 
Foundations of Bioethies. New York: Oxford 
University Press: 1985: Ill. 
To the Editor: 
There is a seriouS fault to Mark A. 
Johnson's argument in his article, "The 
Principle of Double Effect and Safe Sex in 
Marriage: Reflections on a Suggestion" 
(Linacre Quarterly, May 1993). The omis-
sion is not only curiously large, but under-
mines the foundation of his argument, 
namely, that the use of condoms to prevent 
disease transmission in marriage is morally 
wrong because the directly intended act is the 
same as in contraception. The directly 
intended act, according to Dr. Johnson, is 
blocking the deposition of semen into the 
vagina, which is the purpose of marital 
intercourse. 
Dr. Johnson forgets that marriages are 
made up of two people, either of whom could 
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be infected with the AIDS virus. Indeed, 
Earvin "Magic" Johnson, the charismatic 
spokesman of the deplorable "Safe Sex" 
campaign, swears that he was infected by a 
woman. (I use the example of Arthur Ashe, 
another sports celebrity, to remind readers 
that even chaste, virtuous people are sus-
ceptible to the virus through a variety medical 
mishaps.) 
How, then, do the principles of double 
effect apply to cases where the infected 
marriage partner is a woman? In these cases, 
disease prevention is pursued by preventing 
infected vaginal secretions from infecting 
penile skin. The directly intended goal in 
using a condom is thus not contraceptive. I 
propose that in these cases, the four principles 
of the double effect are met: 
1. The directly intended object of the act 
-blocking virally infected vaginal secretions 
from penetrating penile skin - is not 
contradictory to moral law. 
2. The use of the condom is intended to 
prevent infection of the husband by the 
wife, not the prevention of semen entering 
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the vagina. The action of contraception is 
thus only indirectly intended. 
3. The beneficial effect of not transmitting a 
fatal disease to the husband is at least as 
great a good as contraception is a wrong. 
4. The beneficial and deleterious effects are 
, both immediately related to the use of a 
condom. 
My analysis of this problem leaves us with 
the tenuous moral position of saying that 
condoms are an acceptable means of disease 
prevention in marriages where the wife is 
infected with the AIDS virus, but not when 
the husband is infected. I hope that these 
remarks will add completeness to Dr. 
Johnson's remarks, as well as encourage 
further discussion of this important topic. 
Perhaps some other reader will be able to 
meld these two judgements into a simple, 
consistent, and universally applicable moral 
principle. 
- Gregory J. Kenney 
Creighton University School of 
Medicine 
Omaha, Nebraska 
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